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Other chapters engage more intimately with psychoanalytical principles. Chap-
ter 2 argues that Yudhisṭḥira, one of the epic’s protagonists, shows signs of what the
psychoanalyst AndréGreen in 1983 called the “deadmother complex,” a psychological
reaction to amother who is emotionally withdrawn.Chapter 3 carries the theme forward
by tracing such “dead mothers” through multiple generations of the epic’s characters.
The notion of the “dead mother” is intriguing, but as Hiltebeitel framed some of
the epic’s matriarchs (Gaṅga,̄ Kuntı)̄ in this way, I found myself wanting him also
to acknowledge the fact that the Mahab̄har̄ata’s central narrative rests on a broken
patriline—that is, on the repeated failure of men to become fathers. Is this weight-
ing imported from Freud’s Vienna? Besides, if you focus only on the failure of the
Mahab̄har̄ata’s mothers to demonstrate closeness with their mythical children, you’re
apt to miss the epic’s masterful and moving depictions of affectionate fathers (Dhrṭa-
ras̄ṭṛa, Arjuna). These fathers’ love for their sons eventually morphs into agony. Look
too hard for complexes in the Mahab̄har̄ata and you’re in danger of missing its full
complexity.
If, by its own famous advertisement, theMahab̄har̄ata encompasses everything that
exists, then surely it can make room for Freudian psychoanalysis. But should it? Hil-
tebeitel’s earlier scholarship helped a whole generation ofWestern scholars to appre-
ciate just how much the world of the Mahab̄har̄ata—the Sanskrit epic itself, and the
many Mahab̄har̄ata traditions that are its children—had to offer all on its own. The
best parts of Freud’s Mahab̄har̄ata do the same.
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The striking remarks on Christianity scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings
are usually treated as personal views unconnected to the substance of his philosophy.
Miles Hollingworth sees in them the key to it, and to the life of the man; his biogra-
phy makes Wittgenstein’s life and work “speak with a single voice” (3). He doesn’t
find a specialized philosophy of religion in Wittgenstein, nor an apologetic for a
creed, but rather the working out of a perspective on our predicament, where we
stand in a place of tension and decision between life in this world, the Devil’s world
of civilization and “mental intelligence,” and a life of love, following Christ in the
“physical intelligence” of ourhearts, ourmuscles and blood (82–98 ff.). This reading
may seem perverse, but Hollingworth quotes many Wittgenstein passages that sug-
gest something like this; a struggle against “the dehumanizing effect of purely mental
intelligence” (152).
Mental intelligence, on whichWestern, techno-scientific civilization has grown fat
and proud, presumes to know reality through fact-finding and conceptualizations,
measurements and conclusions. It appears to uncover endless, dazzlingly new truths,
but really only ever shows us the kind of thing we ourselves, by adopting a particular
method and approach to reality, have determined it shall show us. Insofar as “‘knowl-
edge’ is a pact we make in advance with the metric of our seeing” (164), “Western
knowledge can only tell you what you already know” (183). The claim that science
reveals What Really Exists is empty. It simply announces one’s choice to look at life
through this “pair of glasses” (201), and pretending differently is “groundless moral-
ism . . . ideological fiat” (26). And similarly for similar claims for religious doctrine.
The dispute between scientists and theologians is false: “If their object is to use their
brains better than each other, then they . . . are as one” (161). By making the emp-
tiness of such truth claims clear, Wittgenstein “manages to call the bluff on the whole
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long history of Western philosophy” (9) and raises the question whether this pre-
tense to impersonal Truth is our way of fearfully “running from revelation” (239),
from going someplace different. “The question ‘What is truth?’ is really the question
‘Where have you been’ (with whom have you conversed?)?” (140), but mental intel-
ligence wants us to “desist from looking into each other’s eyes and souls” (212).
This isn’t the comfortable postmodern idea that we can only tell stories. Quite the
contrary. Mental intelligence demands precisely that one “become the narrator” (16),
and “shaming and outing of the narrator” was “the whole point . . . of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy” (18). The stories we tell about ourselves are “death traps” insofar as “the
story always becomes more important than the subject” (6). What matters isn’t the
names and details a story contains, “but the form and structure by which it does
the containing,” and even if “Christ [himself] walks the earth within this . . . scheme of
containment . . . he will have to play his indicated part” (11–12). Stories are supposed
to explainhowwegot to bewhowe are, to provide our biography and identity, but “the
very idea of identity (5) is sin and evil” (94), and “the Devil is the great biographer”
(96).Hence,Hollingworth’s ownbook is really an antibiography,mentioning the facts
and famous eccentricities of Wittgenstein’s life without presuming to explain any-
thing or nail Wittgenstein to an identity but rather always raising “the question of
how far we can really know anyone by this procedure [of biography],” this “supreme
test-case of the scope and limitations” of mental intelligence’s way of knowing (149).
But what else is there than telling stories, knowing facts and causes, reaching logical
conclusions, and determining identities? There’s the encounter of love, where every-
thing is always now and new, for “each love is its own world” (158), and if lovers speak,
they speak “a one-time language, afterwards forgotten” (180). The “mysticism” (6)
Hollingworth finds in Wittgenstein goes beyond the classic idea of the inaccessibility
to reason of the individual soul’s communion with God precisely insofar as it focuses
on how human beings are moved by each other in ways unrepresentable by rules of rea-
son and logic. Hollingworth sees the “language games” of Wittgenstein’s later philos-
ophy as a “brilliant mockery” of the idea of language having set rules—hence as some-
thing “a rod and wiremachine could replicate” (184). At a deeper level—for there are
any games at all only because living human beings play with each other—Wittgenstein
shows how language “only works because humans can already interact at a level below
it or above it” (162). That is, he shows that “the language used between us is in itself ir-
relevant. It is the effort that youmake to feelmyoriginal tilt of soul thatmatters” (188).
Language is only “a stick that we prod the other person with to get their attention and
to get them looking into our face.What happens after that ismagical . . . eachword be-
tween two human beings is like a doorway of escape to another world. . . . Words are
natural, whatever it is that passes between us is supernatural” (188). In other words,
Wittgenstein’s view of language celebrates love, “for it is love in all its degrees that
wefind in each other’s faces . . .Wittgenstein is famed for writing nearly nothing about
his love life. Yet now we realize that the whole of his philosophy was about it” (158).
This strikes me as crucial and basically right, although—or because—it opens up
huge new questions. In Christian terms, questions of this order will arise if God truly
is to be theGodof love. Some other thingsHollingworth says I findunclear, and some
confused. Space only permitsmentioning one: his (apparent) view of sexuality as nec-
essarily “the point at which the endlessness of love’s dreaming is made to shatter
against a single lesson in friction and plumbing” (207) and of “Wittgenstein’s antag-
onistic and ascetic relationship to sex [. . . as] the living out of his philosophy” (219).
Isn’t this just how sex appears when looked at lovelessly, divorced from yourself and
the one you embrace? Doesn’t Hollingworth here forget precisely his own main
(Wittgensteinian) point, that things decide nothing in themselves, impersonally, but
the question is how I, personally, relate to you?
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